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MAHAN, TACTICS AND PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY 
I hope you have noticed that my title is asymmetrical. We cannot discuss Alfred 
Thayer Mahan's tactical principles, because he neither sought nor found them. Some of 
what I have to say is along lines that this is regrettable. The title also serves as the apology 
of a speaker who is not an historian, here delivering a paper to the eminent historians of 
naval affairs. I do have three points I hope are worthy of your attention. They may even 
be jarring, so I will work up to them carefully. 
After he became celebrated, Mahan felt free to express himself about tactics and 
naval combat, but he never regarded himself as a tactician nor believed that his expertise 
lay there. Still, Mahan's reputation must live with an analytical but artificial distinction 
between tactics and strategy that he helped foster. In rereading Colomb's Naval Warfare 
for the Naval Institute Press's new series, Classics of Sea Power, I was struck by the fact 
that in it there was a refreshing absence of differentiation between policy, strategy, 
operations, tactics, and technology. With Colomb all were a seamless blend. Mahan, who 
had well defined and distinguished strategy and tactics, could not help but be swept back 
into the world of tactics, and (remember that at the beginning of this century the 
characteristics of warships were regarded by all tacticians as their domain) the technology 
that was creating a tactical revolution. 
Here is an example of Mahan's vulnerability. In June, 1906 at the height of his 
international reputation, he ventured to write an article for the Naval Institute Proceedings 
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with lessons learned from the Battle of Tsushima, called "Reflections, Historical and Other, 
Suggested by the Battle of the Japanese Sea." These were wholly tactical with a heavy 
emphasis on the design of future warships. He concluded in favor of (1) armament and 
armor over speed (about which I will say more later), (2) a main battery of mixed calibers, 
and (3) numbers over size of capital ships. In the next issue of the Proceedings appeared 
a scathing rejoinder. It was a mere Lieutenant Commander taking on a Captain of great 
renown, but the Lieutenant Commander's name was William S. Sims, and he was then 
President Theodore Roosevelt's own Inspector of Target Practice. As his title, "The 
Inherent Tactical Qualities of the All-Big-Gun, One-Caliber Battleship of High Speed, 
Large Displacement and Gunpower," made clear, Sims attacked Mahan on all three points. 
Mahan had the misfortune of facing the navy's ex officio gunnery expert, who was also an 
advocate of the "high mix" school of the day: when it came to battleships, nothing was too 
good for the Boys in Blue. Sims intended to destroy Mahan's case, which was along lines 
similar to Soviet Admiral Gorshkov's more recent expression, the best is enemy of good 
enough. HMS Dreadnought was then under construction amidst great debate, as were other 
all big gun prototypes for the navies of the United States and Japan. The advocates were 
not going to accept any contrary views even from a world-famous maritime strategist. 
Sims' attack led from his strength. "Captain Mahan is greatly in error in saying that 
if we determine the number of shots fired by each caliber we may assume a 'probability of 
a proportionate number of hits.' [He] draws his conclusions from the 'volume of fire' of 
different calibers instead of the volume of hitting or 'rapidity of hitting,' which is the only 
true standard of efficiency." Sims goes on to exploit his authority as the Navy's gunnery 
expert to contend that at effective battle range the "danger space" (hitting area) of 12-inch 
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gun will be almost twice that of a 6-inch gun, because of the lower trajectory of the larger 
projectile 1• 
Mahan had the misfortune of having written before m_any reports of the battle were 
m. Specifically, in the same June issue of the Proceedings appeared a detailed narrative 
of it by an American observer, Lieutenant R. D. White, which Sims drew from with 
devestating effect. Mahan, who had lost touch with current technology and who was in any 
case overreaching in his use of history to draw his lessons, did not have the facts to rebut 
Sims. Somewhere in the Proceedings I have seen a generous acquiescence to Sims by 
Mahan but at the moment cannot find it. 
But Sims was disingenuous in places. To further undergird the point above, he wrote 
that Mahan "also assumed that the Japanese rapidity of 6-inch fire was about four times as 
great as that of the 12-inch fire, when as a matter of fact, it was probably not much more 
than twice as great ... we know 12-inch guns can fire two shots a minute and that 6-inch 
controlled firing is at a rate of four shots per minute." In contrast, another giant of navy 
fire control, Bradley A Fiske, had written only a year earlier, " ... the energy of projectiles 
thrown by a big gun is about equal to the aggregate energies of the projectiles thrown by 
smaller guns of equal aggregate weight, and the smaller guns can be fired more often. A 
12-inch gun, for instance, weighs about as much as eight 6-inch guns [note the parallel 
choice of caliber for comparison with Sims] and a 12-inch projectile has about as much 
energy as eight 6-inch projectiles; but a 6-inch gun can fire projectiles about eight times as 
often, so that in a minute 6-inch guns can fire projectiles having eight times as much energy 
as an equal weight of 12-inch guns. They also eXl)end eight times as much ammunition [the 
emphasis is Fiske's]" ~ 
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Now, Fiske was of course describing schematically-- he was a brilliant mathematical 
modeler-- but his expertise stands in stark contrast with Sims'. For one thing, it is dubious 
that a 12" gun of the day could be fired twice a minute. Since Fiske was the technical 
expert who made possible the ambitions of Sims for centralized fire control and continuous 
aim fire, Sims either was or ought to have been aware of Fiske's position. The technical 
debate was crucial in the final decision to adopt the all big gun ship. Fiske himself soon 
was converted, doubtless influenced by his last, underlined, statement. But Mahan was not 
well enough informed tactically and technologically to deal with gunnery issues. We will see 
that his views were hardier vis-a-vis Sims when it came to the issue of speed. 
When one compartmentalizes strategy and tactics he is led into a chicken or egg 
problem as regards which is paramount. This leads to the first point I have to make to a 
body who may regard strategy as both the more interesting and preeminent. It is a 
commonplace, true as far as it goes, that strategy must direct operations and choose the 
scenes of action, else battle becomes purposeless and a thing unto itself. It is also true that 
when the goal is the establishment of future force requirements to execute a desirable 
military strategy, a top down approach is always impeccable. 
But pause a minute and listen to Clausewitz. I have quoted him at length elsewhere 3 
lest someone suspect that I am using him out of the whole context of On War. ''The latter 
[strategic planning] therefore, can never be considered as something independent," wrote 
Clausewitz, "it can only become valid when one has reason to be confident of tactical 
success ... it is useful to emphasize that all strategic planning rests on tactical success alone, 
and that-- whether the solution is arrived at in battle or not-- this is in all cases the actual 
fundamental basis for the decision"~ Tactics determine the efficacy of forces; it is the 
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correlation of two forces that reveals what strategy is supportable; and it is a supportable 
military strategy that limits national aims and ambitions. Here is a little example. Both 
Mahan and Corbett knew the British Admiralty regarded one three-decker as the equal of 
two two-deckers. With that calculus the Admiralty strove to blockade with firepower 
equivalent to that of the French ships in a port. Equivalence sufficed because of the Royal 
Navy's ship-for-ship superiority in combat potential~ Tactical success without strategy is 
a meandering river; strategy without tactical success is a dream that becomes a nightmare. 
As for the second element of the strategist's proposition, that strategy guides future 
requirements, it is equally true that the capabilities of existing forces must govern present 
planning, in peace and war. This seems a point to make at present, when a drawdown of 
national capability is under way. It is too easy to slash away at the United States Navy 
without realigning the strategy and deployments that the lower force levels can support. 
I do not want to make much of this except to note the two are bound together. 
Mahan was continually drawn into questions of tactics and technology, and in practice no 
one thought much of the distinction. One of my favorites of Mahan is 'The true speed of 
war is not headlong precipitancy, but the unremitting energy which wastes not time." The 
intimacy of the bond between strategy and tactics leaps at us when we see the rest of the 
passage. 'The great end of a war fleet. . .is not to chase, nor to fly, but to control the seas 
... Not speed, but power of offensive action, is the dominant factor in war . . . Force does 
not exist for mobility, but mobility for force. It is of no use to get there first unless, when 
the enemy in tum arrives, you also have the most men, the greater force"~ The speed of 
the battle fleet was much at issue then. Sims and many other officers notwithstanding, 
there was a serious tradeoff between ·armament, armor, and speed. Mahan was forcefully 
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for guns and armor, and ultimately that was what the U. S. Navy chose: the slowest battle 
line of the world's navies, right up to World War II, and a disposition away from the fast 
battleships and battlecruisers of Great Britain and Japan. This is not the place to develop 
who was right and why, but if asked I will argue that Mahan and the U.S. Navy have the 
better case. 
* * * * * 
The second and far more serious mischief Mahan created is traceable directly to the 
book we are honoring here today. Everyone will recognize the passage: "from time to time 
the structure of tactics has to be wholly torn down, but the foundations of strategy so far 
remain, as though laid upon a rock." Mahan believed the principles of strategy were easier 
to discern than those of tactics, because the latter "using as its instruments the weapons 
made by man shares in the change and progress of the race" 7. As far as I know (I am 
tentative only because Mahan was so prolific) the only tactical principle he enunciated was 
in support of concentration. Concentration of force, either strategic or tactical, may or may 
not be the most important principle of war but either way it the most obvious and least 
exciting, the sort of thing that school boys find out the first time two gang up on one. It can 
also expressed in a corruption of an old aphorism, which may be rephrased for military 
purposes, "Never pick on somebody your own size." I thought of this when I heard some 
people say we were behaving like bullies when we went into Grenada a few years back. 
Whatever you may think of Mahan's circumscribed view of the robustness only of 
strategic principles, I can tell you that I was a faithful disciple until 1982, and there were 
generations of naval officers who subscribed to it. But Mahan was wrong. ''Tactics change, 
but that does not preclude the search for tactical principles, and if there are strategic 
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principles, that does not mean that strategies do not change. Strategies as well as tactics 
are influenced by 'weapons made by man.' We may forgive Mahan for not foreseeing how 
weapons of the future would influence strategy, but there was evidence of change even as 
he wrote. All the strategic effects of blockading were modified by the transition from sail 
to steam. Sailing ships that stayed on station for months were being replaced by ships that 
lacked endurance and depended on coaling stations, the competition for which itself had 
a profound influence on strategy" ~ The very term for an intercontinental ballistic missile, 
"a strategic weapon," and the Polaris and Trident strategic submarines which carry them, 
belie that strategic concepts are etched in stone. Mahan said the scales fell from his eyes 
when he speculated as to the consequences if Hannibal had attacked Rome from the sea. 
We need only to give Hannibal the means to deliver one Hiroshima-sized atomic bomb to 
see all the strategy of Carthage and Rome overturned. 
A case study of Mahan's faith in his tenet of strategic constancy is the way he deals 
with blockade. In it is all the false dichotomy of strategy and tactics. In 1895 Mahan was 
asked by the Royal United Service Institution whether new technology had so altered tactics 
that a blockade would no longer be effective. It was clear that steam, steel, mines, and 
torpedoes were affecting the way ships would fight. Mahan clung to his faith in historical 
precedent and strategic principles and reaffirmed the blockade as a tool of strategy. Later, 
after assimilating the lessons of the Russo-Japanese and Spanish-American Wars, he 
reaffirmed his stand in Naval Strategy ~ Mahan referred to two cases. The first was 
offensive and interdiction of trade; it was illustrated by the North's blockade of the South 
in the Civil War. The second was defensive; it was illustrated by the Royal Navy's 
containment of French and Spanish fleets in the Napoleonic wars. Mahan largely set aside 
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the former and concentrated on the latter, and it is here as well as anywhere that we 
observe Mahan's focus on command of the sea and fleet actions: the object of blockade was 
a fleet. With that perspective, he showed that distant blockade was nothing new. Nelson, 
he pointed out, was happy to stand back because he wanted his enemy to come out. 
Mahan stressed that a blockade was not an absolute thing. With a defensive 
blockade the question was "Does this impose upon him such risks as to give a considerable 
chance of either stopping or crippling him? And not only is this chance in your favor to 
be considered at the immediate locality, but also as to its deterrent effect upon the 
enemy" 1~ Mahan had a fine sense of scouting. Success is, he said, "a matter of look-out, 
instituted and sustained, and of inter-communications between vessels of the blockading 
force ... this is the crux of the matter. "Mahan concluded" ... the old question and the new 
alike is not 'Can the enemy be prevented from coming ouf but 'If he does, can touch with 
him be gained and preserved?' Steam, in my opinion, has simply widened the question, not 
changed its nature. I believe that provision can be made which will give [blockade] a high 
probability of success, but I do not believe in certainties in war" 1 ~ 
The above is Mahan at his best. We find him adapting his vast reservoir of history 
and extending it to the present. Indeed, he had flawlessly anticipated the Royal Navy's 
constraint of the German High Seas fleet from out of Scapa Flow in World War I. We 
must concede to him that execution is a matter of tactical detail, whether with sail or 
steam. But the events of World War I also illustrate the limits of Mahan's perspective, and 
it was very much a shortcoming of strategic vision. Blockade of the High Seas Fleet was 
necessary but not sufficient. There was to be the rest of the German navy, what Sir Julien 
Corbett called "the cruisers" now manifest as U-boats, that would threaten the lifeblood of 
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Britain. Offensive, not defensive, blockade would eventually hold the key to the war at sea. 
We may even say that the blockaders became themselves the blockaded, once we adopt 
Mahan's own relaxation of the distance from the ports at which it is imposed. 
Though Corbett expressed his role of cruisers with clarity in how they played for and 
against the interdiction of trade, he himself did not foresee the efficacy of the U-boat and 
the scale of merchant shipping protection it would require. Nevertheless, Corbett best 
established the business of navies. He did so very much against the preponderant attitude 
of naval officers who embraced Mahan and his words, "the proper main objective of the 
navy is the enemy's navy" 1~ Whatever provisos Mahan applied, his followers too eagerly 
accepted the big battle as the be-all of a fleet. Corbett starts with ''The object of naval 
warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or 
to prevent the enemy from securing it" 1~ Already Corbett confronts Mahan who disparaged 
~erre de course, or any other form of sea denial as a proper role of a fleet. But Corbett's 
opening salvo is merely warming his Mahan-oriented readers to the subject. He reaches 
the kernel of his position four pages later with: "Command of the sea, therefore, means 
nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military 
purposes." Lest the reader fail to appreciate the sharp distinction between operations on 
land and sea, as at least one recent writer has done 1 ~ Corbett follows immediately with 
'The object of naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, 
the conquest of territory. The difference is fundamental. .. [Communications ashore] refers 
to the communications of the army alone, and not to the wider communications which are 
part of the life of the nation" 1~ By passing too quickly from the denial of movement of 
goods and services ( offensive blockade) to the containment of the enemy fleet ( defensive 
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blockade), Mahan helped make his case that the strategy of blockade was as robust as ever, 
but begged the equally important question of blockade of communications and commerce. 
And more: here are the delicious words of a great Russian leader, Admiral S. 0. 
Makarov's on the subject: "Up to the present this [command of the sea] has been 
understood to mean that the fleet commanding the sea openly plies upon it and the beaten 
antagonist does not dare to leave his ports. Would this be so today? Instructions bearing 
on the subject counsel the victor to avoid night attack from the torpedo-boats of his 
antagonist. . .if the matter were represented to a stranger he would be astonished . He would 
probably ask whether he properly understood that a victorious fleet should protect itself 
from the remnant of a vanquished enemy" 1~ Mahan was blind to the extent that mines, 
torpedo boats, submarines, in due course land based aircraft, and in the present day land 
launched missiles, would add new constraints on the ability of a modern fleet to assert sea 
control against an inferior enemy who wished to dispute it. We have two modem examples 
of nations whose navies were utterly swept from the seas that still created the greatest 
difficulties for their opponents. One is Japan off Okinawa in 1945, whose Kamikazes 
destroyed ships of the U. S. Navy at the rate of one a day. The other is Argentina, which 
though isolated from the Falklands by sea, posed a frightening threat of air, missile, and 
even submarine attack (with an effective order of battle of one submarine!) throughout the 
war. 
• • • • • • • 
Now I tum to a matter of taste or preference and offer it for your consideration. 
Thus far I have asserted that there probably are as many durable principles of tactics as of 
strategy. But I prefer to refer to constants instead of principles, so that I may draw a 
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distinction between them and trends, the things wrought by "the change and progress of the 
race." I am glad to have an opportunity to express this point of view to historians, however 
tenuous is the connection with Alfred Thayer Mahan and his penchant for principles, 
because there is much in it for you to ponder. 
Before getting to the underappreciated significance of trends, it is well first to 
distinguish their companion, constants, from principles. A principle is a guide to action. A 
constant is an assertion about unchanging truth. I must be careful here. The dictionary 
definitions of principle are sufficiently encompassing that the user may make about what 
he wishes of them: rule, code, law, doctrine, assumption, guide, fundamental, 
comprehensive, a law or fact of nature, are all terms one finds associated with a principle. 
I think Mahan himself thought of principles as what may more precisely be termed 
constants. The six great properties or factors he labeled elements of sea power in Chapter 
One of The Influence of Sea Power are descriptive, not prescriptive. One thing is clear: 
whether the element is a principle or a constant, whether it is prescriptive or descriptive, 
Mahan's interest is with immutability. 
The usual principles of war have no such ambiguity. They are prescriptive: they say 
"do this to succeed." In contrast a constant says "this is so, now apply the knowledge wisely." 
A principle from the Army's FM 100-5 is "Direct every military operation towards a clearly 
defined, decisive, and attainable objective" 1 ~ A tactical constant, taken from Fleet Tactics: 
Theory and Practice and chosen because it is attention-getting and perhaps a bit of a 
surprise, reads thus: ''The pace at which control of a fleet can be exercised has not changed 
much through history. Planning, doctrine, and training as well as combat experience help 
reduce the possibility of a commander and his fleet being overwhelmed by the tempo of 
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battle" 1~ 
There was a time-- I think it is passing now-- when students of military history sought 
principles of war. We know Mahan espoused them, as did his inspiration, Jomini. Corbett 
for navies and Fuller for armies were supreme in organizing and structuring the lessons of 
history, with as much emphasis on constants as principles. Historians _mm historian eschew 
the function of structuring, but few resist drawing lessons, and in fact we all know that an 
historian without premises will describe chaos, a pot pouri, or something worse. 
Since that is so, I want to urge on you my perspective. It is that the establishment 
of trends is every bit as worth your while as the establishment of principles or constants. 
At the tactical level, which is the one I have studied, trends are probably more important. 
Obviously Mahan thought so: "tactics ... shares in the change and progress of the race." But 
then he ignored the implication, which was to study the changes. Here are some examples 
of trends, taken from Fleet Tactics 1~ 
o Speed in the platform has become subordinate to speed of weapon delivery. Speed 
of delivery is governed by scouting and command and control processes as well as the sheer 
velocity of weapons. 
o Scouting systems have had to race to keep up with weapon range ... The effects 
of air, surface, and subsurface scouts are increasingly interrelated because more new 
weapons cross the boundaries of the three domains. 
o Tactical commanders have had to devote more of their attention to scouting and 
less to delivery of firepower. 
The importance of establishing trends has to do with helping military men avoid 
fighting the last war. Their dilemma is this. The experience of the older generation, who 
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are the leaders directing preparations for the next one, is going to be dated. Presently the 
dating is since 1945, if we are talking about a war which threatens the national jugular vein. 
Subsequent experience with the likes of Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon, and the 
Persian Gulf, colors their thinking. Insofar as the combat in those small wars and big crises 
is concerned, the difference between them and World War II is the difference between 
penny ante poker and a game for table stakes. Consider this. Admiral Kelso's standard of 
performance for his strike aircraft in the attacks against Libya was a no-loss criterion: not 
one prisoner to by marched around Tripoli. In Korea and Vietnam losses of 2% per sortie 
were thought to be serious, 5% unsustainable. But in the five big force-on-force carrier 
duels in the Pacific during World War II (Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa 
Cruz Islands, and Philippine Sea) the average aircraft losses per battle were 40% for the 
Americans and 60% for the Japanese. We don't think that way anymore, but if there are 
enough chips in the pot we will see such losses again. 
Happily because of the turmoil taking place in the Soviet Union, little wars are now 
more likely to continue to be at the core of relevance. Nevertheless, we are as dated in 
understanding the -nature of real naval combat as were the tacticians who struggled to sort 
out the effects of new technology-- steam, rifled guns, armor and steel hulls, fire control and 
electricity-- during the period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the beginning of 
World War I, a period when there were very few data from combat at sea. To most military 
men the study of history is restricted to study of the last war. If they have time or 
inclination to probe history at all, it is usually as much for inspiration as for analysis. Small 
wonder that we officers are accused of preparing to fight the last war. 
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If historians are going to help military men to fight in the future, then a search for 
constants, or principles as Mahan called them, is not enough: it is necessary, but not 
sufficient. To see from the last war to the next however dimly, the key is the study of 
trends. In order to see trends one must grasp the sweep of history, and know what 
transpired looking back from the last war to the next-to-last, to the next-to-next-to-last ... 
Few men in uniform have time to do that and fewer still believe the rewards are worth the 
time. But it is very important. When I wrote Fleet Tactics and saw that trends were at the 
heart of understanding, I had to incorporate some naval history; there was no evading it. 
Not very much-- only four chapters-- but nothing I did was more valuable in gaining 
perspective about nval tactics of the future. I commend to you that trends are the neglected 
aspect of military history. I have never seen a military historian make that point, unless it 
is Trevor Dupuy. 
• • • • • • 
There is one last self-appointed duty to perform, and it is a pleasant one. Seeing now 
that military history at the tactical level is for more than entertainment, we should all want 
to know how good were Alfred Thayer Mahan's descriptions of naval tactics. Does Mahan 
help us discern the trends when we look for them? Well, not directly, because at the 
tactical level that was never his object, but the raw material is all there. Now, I cannot 
critique his research nor would you want me to try. But I can talk about his insight into 
naval operations, battle tactics, and naval leadership, and it is a great strength. I think he 
is at his best in his first book, The Gulf and Inland Waters. before he became captivated 
by strategic constants. Strange to say, clear narrative that holds the reader's attention, 
engagement after engagement, is not easy to write. For example, the renowned Civil War 
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historian, Bruce Catton, fails. With him your mind wanders. Catton has so many personal 
anecdotes of the everyday man-- it is like the fetish of modem journalism and its face-to-
face interviews-- that one loses sight of the battle . I know Catton wants to put us there, to 
smell the gunpowder and fear, but that won't do for my stated purpose. A military historian 
who does both is John Keegan, not in The Price of Admiralty because the sea is not 
Keegan's realm, but in The Face of Battle. Keegan has the knack of giving you the forest 
and the trees: both the tactical and the personal truth of combat. 
Put Catton aside and compare Mahan with two of the best writers on the Civil War, 
Douglas Southall Freeman in, say, Lee's Lieutenants, and U. S. Grant in his Memoirs. 
About that war I think Mahan had their clarity and insight. To another standard, he also 
had great influence among the naval historians of later secondary works, like Carrol S 
Alden, Allan F. Westcott, William 0. Stevens, Fletcher Pratt and E. B. Potter. Mahan is 
lucid, objective and searching. Those who are only acquainted with his ponderous and 
pedantic style of later years should be treated to a sample: 
"It was the daily custom for one of the gunboats to tow down a mortar-boat and 
place it just above Craighead's, remaining near by during the twenty-four hours as guard. 
The mortar threw its shells across the point into Pillow, and as the fire was harassing to the 
enemy, the River Defence Fleet, which was now ready for action, determined to make a 
dash at her. Between 4 and 5 A. M. on the morning of the 10th of May [1862], the day 
after [Flag Officer] Foote's departure, the Cincinnati placed Mortar No. 16, Acting-Master 
Gregory, in the usual position, and then made fast herself to a great drift-pile on the same 
side, with her head up stream; both ends of her lines being kept on board, to be easily 
slipped if necessary. The mortar opened fire at five. At six the eight Confederate rams left 
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their moorings behind the fort and steamed up, the black smoke from their tall smoke-
stacks being seen by the fleet above as they moved rapidly up river. At 6.30 they came in 
sight of the vessels at Plum Point. As soon as they were seen by the Cincinnati she slipped 
her lines, steamed out into the river, and then rounded to with her head down stream, 
presenting her bow-guns, and opening at once upon the enemy. The latter approached 
gallantly but irregularly, the lack of the habit of acting in concert making itself felt, while 
the fire of the Cincinnati momentarily checked and, to a certain extent, scattered them. The 
leading vessel, the General Bragg. was much in advance of her consorts. She advanced 
swiftly along the Arkansas shore, passing close by the mortar-boat and above the Cincinnati; 
then rounding to she approached the latter at full speed on the starboard quarter, striking 
a powerful blow in this weak part of the gunboat. The two vessels fell alongside, the 
Cincinnati firing her broadside as they came together; then the ram swinging clear made 
down stream, and, although the Confederate commander claims that her tiller ropes alone 
were out of order, she took no further part in the fray"2~ 
Sound like the brown water naval war in Viet Nam? Not quite, but closer than any 
alternative you could have named in 1964. Had any of our young naval officers read it as 
part of their shift in thinking from blue water operations to the land-locked guerrilla war 
they were about to face? Not very likely. 
Mahan moves here and carries you along. His description of the intricate Vicksburg 
campaign is vivid and (as far as I can tell) the source of many later writers' descriptions. 
It wants only an appreciation of how much Grant's operations depended on the Mississippi-
- how essential the rivers were to everything he accomplished then and before, at Fort 
Henry and Fort Donelson, and how Grant could be light on his feet because the river craft 
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were his logistics tail; and even that may be inferred. I had no idea until I read The Gulf 
and Inland Waters how swiftly the Union Navy swept on up or down a river, wreaking 
havoc, once a strong point was breeched. A mere three days after Fort Henry fell three 
Union gunboats had penetrated up the Tennessee River all the way to Florence, in northern 
Alabama, destroying bridges, riverboats, and goods along the shore. It would be thus again 
and again. The mobility and logistic might of ships at sea is well known; they were just as 
remarkable on rivers. 
It seems to me the book that Mahan published seven years later and we honor today, 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, is also cogent, and must have been harder to 
research. I do not say that Mahan was a better nor more accurate narrator of naval 
operations than Colomb or Corbett. And they all were flowery and lacked crispness, for 
this was the Victorian age in all its ostentation. His words are like a many-gabled mansion, 
bright with frills, "All tarted up," as grandmother would say. But I like Mahan's elegance 
in small doses, and he knows seamanship, and he paints a picture full of truth, heroic 
enough but also critical. 
• • • • • • 
I have said four things, and in doing so offered three pieces of advice. The first is 
to correct the impression that strategy is somehow "more important." Strategy is 
constrained by the capacity to win battles; means must determine ends just as much as ends 
govern means. My advice is to think of them as two sides of a single coin, and if you are 
enthralled by strategy, remember to look at the backside of the coin. 
The second is that there are principles, or constants, and there are trends, or changes 
in warfare. This is true of both strategy and tactics, and for that matter of policy, logistics, 
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and campaigning ( or operational art). My advice is to forget forever the common 
interpretation of Mahan that he preached the search merely for principles of strategy. The 
uses and lessons of history run much deeper, and are in any case as likely to have tactical 
as strategic consequences. 
The third is a theorem deriving from the first two. It is that discerning trends is the 
special way history can help keep from fighting the last war. Since tactics are as important 
in the long run as strategy, and since both constants and trends of tactics will be manifest 
to an acute observer, it is important to look for both. My advice to military historians is 
to help military men, who seldom know history well enough to help themselves, establish 
the tactical and technological trends of the past to help them see the implications for the 
future. 
Fourth and last, I am pleased to help honor Alfred Thayer Mahan. He still enriches 
our knowledge of naval battles and maritime operations, their ships, their tactics, and their 
leaders. That is as important now as is the great influence he once had in the citadels of 
power in bygone days. 
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